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ABSTRACT
This study provides evidence which we believe challenges some
conventional assumptions about the promotion process. Based on
survey information collected from a large random sample of U.S.
private sector firms, we reach two main conclusions. First,
seniority independent of productivity appears to play a significant
role even in nonunion promotion decisions. Second, the differences
between union and nonunion promotion processes, at least with regard
to the weight assigned to seniority per se, appear to be important
but less dramatic than is popularly supposed.
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Cambridge, MA 02139The relative weights afforded seniority and ability in the
promotion process have been a long standing source of debate. At
least within the economics profession, it istypically assumed that
promotions in nonunion settings are awarded on a purely meritocratic
basis. This assumption is consistent with the humancapital view
that the upward slope of the tenure/earningsprofile should simply
reflect the growth in employees' productivity with services!'
Though some would argue that promotions are most often awarded
meritocratically even in union settings, the more widespread view is
that unions restrict managements' ability topromote the most
qualified candidate. Collective bargaining agreements which assign
seniority a role in the promotion process are fairly common and case
studies suggest that the weight actually given to seniority is often
even greater than the terms of these provisions would suggest.-'
The perception that unionization constrains managements'ability to
promote as they please has contributed to the popular belief that
union firms are less efficient than nonunion firms.
This paper presents data which we believe call into question
the usual beliefs about how promotions are made. Basedon survey
information collected from a large random sample of U.S. private
sector firms, we reach two main conclusions. First, seniority
independent of productivity appears to play a significant role even
in nonunion promotion decisions. Second, the differences between
union and nonunion promotion processes, at least with regard to the
weight assigned to seniority, appear to be important but less
dramatic than is popularly supposed.Section I of the paper describes the survey on which our main
conclusions rest. The data obtained from this survey are presented
in Section II. In Section III, we discuss why we chose to ask
managers about how promotion decisions are made at their firms,
rather than drawing conclusions solely from econometric analysis of
actual promotions data. Evidence concerning promotions based on two
companies' personnel data are presented in Section IV; these are
consistent with our survey data. The paper's final section offers
some concluding thoughts.
I. Collection of the Survey Data
The data on which this paper's central conclusions rest were
obtained from a mail survey which asked employers both about formal
policies governing seniority's role in the promotions process and,
more importantly, about the role played by seniority in actual
promotion decisions.
We sent our survey to 1025 randomly selected nonagricultural,
nonconstruction firms from the 1981 edition of Standard and Poor's
Register..J Firms based outside the U.S. were excluded from the
sample. Standard and Poor's generally lists companies with 50 plus
employees and l,00O,0O0 plus in sales in their Register; these
companies represent perhaps two—thirds of total U.S. nonagricultural,
nonconstruction employment
Whenever possible, we mailed our survey to that individual at
each firm who appeared to be in charge of personnel matters (e.g.,
the Executive Vice—President of Personnel, the Personnel Director or
the Industrial Relations Vice—President). In cases where no such
—2—individual's name could be obtained, the letter was sent to the Chief
Executive Officer of the corporation. The original letterwas dated
August 15, 1981. If no response was received from a firm within six
weeks after our first request was mailed, a secondrequest was sent
to the original contact. Altogether, we received 429responses (a
response rate of 42 percent). Because of various data problems,
there were somewhat fewer usable responses.
A question at the start of the survey form asked howmany
exempt employees (most likely managers and/or professionals),
nonexempt salaried employees and hourly employees were affected by
the respondent's personnel decisions; all subsequent answers referto
the largest of these subordinategroups. One of the later
questionnaire items inquired whether a majority of those in the
relevant group were covered by a collective bargainingagreement. In
the analysis which follows, we look separately at threeresponse
categories: union hourly employees; nonunion hourly employees; and
nonunion salaried employees (nonexempt and exempt combined).-"
Much previous work on the role played by seniority inpromotion
decisions has focused on collective bargaining agreement provisions.
We asked whether either a collective bargainingagreement or a
written policy dealing explicitly with the role of seniority In
promotion decisions covered the group of employees referred to by
each respondent. Where we were told that such an agreement or policy
did exist, we asked whether the relevant language stated that
seniority should be the single most important factor in determining
who would be promoted.
—3—Our primary objective was to learn more about actual practice
concerning the role of seniority in promotion decisions. To this
end, respondents were asked the following question:
In actual practice, are junior employees promoted instead of
more senior employees who want the job?
17 Yes, if it is believed that the junior employee will do
better than the senior employee on the next job or on
later jobs.
1/ Yes, if it is believed that the junior employee will do
significantly better than the senior employee on the next
job or on later jobs.
LT No, never.
This question produces the most important information in our data set
for exploring the issue at hand. The responses indicate the strength
of the preference for senior employees when promotions occur ."
II.Survey Results
The data from our survey provide evidence both on formal
policies and on actual practice concerning seniority's role in the
promotions process. The relevant results are presented in this
section of the paper.
Written Promotion Provisions Covering Various Groups
Table 1 summarizes the content of written policy provisions
governing promotions as reported by our survey respondents.
The first things to note are that very few nonunion employees
are covered by written provisions which specify seniority's role in
the promotions process and that even fewer are covered by written
provisions which assign seniority a determining role in that
process. Fewer than 5 percent of our nonunion hourly respondents and





Proportion for which contract
or written policy specifies role
of seniority in promotion decisions .851 .244 .070
(P)
Given a contract or written policy
which specifies seniority's role,
proportion for which relevant
language states seniority to be most
important factor in promotion decisions .483 .132 .000
(SMI)
Proportion for which language in
a contract or written policy states
seniority to be most important
factor in promotion decisions .410 .032 .000
(P x SMI)
Number of observations on which
above proportions based 134 156 100
—5—none of our salaried nonunion respondents indicated the presence of a
written policy clause stating that seniority should be the most
important factor in promotion decisions.
In contrast, a large majority (85 percent) of our union hourly
respondents reported provisions specifying seniority's role in
promotion decisions and almost half (48 percent) of those reporting
such provisions said they made seniority the key factor determining
who gets promoted. Thus, just over 40 percent of our union hourly
respondents reported coverage by written provisions making length of
service the primary factor in promotion decisions.
We know of no other comparable data on written promotions
provisions covering nonunion employees. Our 40 percent figure for
union hourly employees is somewhat larger than that produced by a
Bureau of Labor Statistics study of 1967—1968 major collective
bargaining agreements, in which only 29 percent of contracts had a
provision specifying seniority to be either the "sole factor" or the
"primary factor" in promotions.-' However, our figure agrees well
with that produced by a more recent Bureau of National Affairs study
of 400 representative collective bargaining agreements, in which 45
percent of the contracts specified seniority to be either the "sole
factor" or the "determining factor" in promotions
Based solely on the terms of the relevant written provisions,
then, one might be tempted to conclude that almost no nonunion hourly
employees or nonunion salaried employees but a substantial minority
of union hourly employees worked in settings where length of service
had an important independent effect on promotion decisions. Overall,
—6—assuming that seniority plays a role in promotion decisions only
insofar as specified in written policy or collective bargaining
agreement clauses, a very rough estimate based on our survey
responses would be that 8 percent of our county's private sector,
nonagricultural, nonconstruction employees work in settings where
seniority plays an important role in the promotion process.91'
Actual Practice Concerning Promotions
The answers we received to our question on the role actually
played by seniority in promotion decisions suggest that these
conclusions would be seriously in error.
As reported in Table 2, over half (56 percent) of our nonunion
hourly responses and over half (57 percent) of our salaried nonunion
responses indicated that in practice senior employees are afforded
substantial preference in the promotions process (meaning either that
a junior employee would never be promoted ahead of a senior employee
or that a junior employee would be promoted ahead of a senior
employee only if expected to perform significantly better on the next
job or on later jobs). Thus, seniority seems to matter for many
nonunion promotion decisions even though there are few written
provisions specifying that it should.
Comparing union hourly and nonunion hourly responses, the union
figures show both a higher total percentage of cases where senior
employees receive substantial preference (76 percent versus 56
percent) and a higher percentage of cases where a senior employee
would never lose out to a junior competitor (33 percent versus 15
percent). The implicit advancement rights afforded to senior
employees do seem to be both more prevalent and stronger for union
—7—Table 2: Actual Practice Concerning the Role of






Proportion reporting that junior
employees never promoted ahead
of senior employees .333 .146 .120
Proportion reporting that junior
employees promoted ahead of senior
employees only If they are expected
to perform significantly better on
the next job or on later jobs .430 .411 .450
Proportion reporting that junior
employees promoted ahead of senior
employees jf they are expected to
perform better on the next job or
on later jobs .237 .443 .430
Number of observations on which
above proportions based 135 158 100
—8—hourly than for nonunion hourly work groups. Though these
union/nonunion differences are substantial andstatistically
significant, it is noteworthy that they are not quite so pronounced
as the differences in the terms of relevant writtenprovisions
discussed above.
While we know of no other data that permit theindependent
effect of seniority on promotions to be identified in theway our
data do, two interesting new interview studies haveproduced results
that seem consistent with our findings. Edwin Dean obtained
interview data from 134 union establishments and 47 nonunion
establishments; these establishments were not selected in a purely
random fashion, but do cover a fairly wide cross section of U.S.
industry. At 70 percent of the union establishments and at 43
percent of the nonunion establishments in Dean's sample, seniority
was ranked the first or second most important selection criterion in
promotion (the other choices being written tests, written performance
evaluations, Interviews, educational qualifications, prior related
work experience and supervisors' recommendations).-! Quinn Mills
obtained interview data pertaining to 248 actual promotion decisions
at a randomlyselected sample of firms. While his study focused
primarilyon the effect of job posting on promotion decisions, he
does conclude that "a very substantial minority of seniorpersons are
promoted over better—performing junior persons.'
Based on what our respondents had to say about actual practice,
then, we estimate that over half of both nonunion hourly employees
and nonunion salaried employees and over three quarters of union
hourly employees work in settings where length of service has an
—9—important independent role in the promotions process. Overall, among
perhaps 60 percent of our country's private sector, nonagricultural,
nonconstruction employees, senior individuals are afforded
substantial preference in promotion decisions.l3l4'
111. What Can Promotions History Data Tell Us?
Whydidwe choose to collect survey information on how
promotion decisions are made, rather than just looking at the
computerized personnel data we have investigated for other purposes?
In this section of the paper we discuss the limitations of using
company personnel records, which contain valuable information on
workers' advancement, their length of service, and their likely
contribution in higher—level jobs, for addressing the question at
hand.
Promotions Equations Without Measures of Capacity to Perform
Data from company personnel files on individuals' work
histories may be useful for studying some aspects of the promotion
process. However, unless these data sources contain "perfect"
measures of individuals' relative capacities to perform in the job or
jobs they might be promoted to, they cannot be used to estimate the
"true" effect of seniority perse.
The following simple setup illustrates this point. Suppose
that we were able to identify a group of individuals who were
starting out at some particular job level and that all these
individuals faced similar promotion opportunities. Let the promotion
process relevant for this group be captured by the following equation:
—10—(1) P =a+S+ 'y+C
whereP equals 1 if a promotion has occurred and equals 0 otherwise,
S represents years of service, C represents capacity to perform at
the next level in the relevant job hierarchy and c represents the
15/ equation error (assumed to be orthogonal to S and C).— If it
were possible to measure C perfectly, then would give an unbiased
estimate of the effect of seniority per se on advancement out of the
level under analysis. For heuristic purposes, assume that it is
impossible to derive even a poorly—measured proxy for C and that as a
result we must fit the following misspecified model:
(2) P =a'+ (3'S +c'
The expected value of the service coefficient in equation (2) is:
(3) E ((3') (3 +y.coy (S,C)
var S
Coy (S,C) has the same sign as the correlation between S and C; var S
is always positive. If merit does in fact play an important role in
the promotion process affecting the group under consideration
(y>O), so that the "best" employees in the level tend to be
promoted, the within—group correlation between S and C should become
negative (ccv (S,c) <0).Thus, in this case, 'willrepresent
a downward—biased estimate of the true effect of length of service on
promotions. Even if longer service improves one's promotion
prospects (>O), a negative estimated length—of—service
coefficient could easily be obtained. Only if merit plays no role in
the promotion process (y =0)will 'representan unbiased
estimate of the true effect of length of service on promotions.
—11—Promotions Equations With Imperfect Measures of Capacity to Perform
Company personnel records do sometimes contain measures of
individuals' likely success on the job or jobs they might be promoted
to. However, these measures are most certainly imperfect. Suppose
that an imperfect measure of capacity to perform in the next job or
later jobs were obtained:
(4) N =C+
whereM is the available measure, C represents true capacity to
perform in the next job or later jobs, andis the error term. If
N were introduced into the simple promotion model of equation (1) in
lieu of C:
(5) Pa"+"S'+y"M+c"
the expected value of the length of service coefficient would be:
(6) E(") =+ ycoy (S,C) var
var S var C —coy(s,C)2 +varS var
Comparison of (6), which shows the service coefficient bias in a
promotions equation which includes an imperfect measure of potential,
against (3), which shows the service coefficient bias in a promotions
equation with no potential measure, reveals that the introduction of
the imperfect potential measure should reduce but not eliminate any
downward bias initially present in the service coefficient (since it
can be shown that (var/(var S var C —coy(S,C)2 +varS var
is less than 1/var S). Nevertheless, as long as the C—proxy captures C
with error, the estimated effect of S can be expected to be biased
downward.
—12—Promotion Equations Exploiting Longitudinal Data
In principle, it might seem that the lack of direct measures of
individuals' differing capacities could be dealt with by using more
sophisticated longitudinal econometric models of the promotion process.
In practice, this approach is unlikely to be satisfactory. Assume, as
before, that the promotion process in year t can be represented by the
following equation:
(7) Pt =a+ + +
where equals 1 if a promotion occurs in year t and equals 0
otherwise, St represents length of service as of the start of year t, C
represents capacity to perform at the next level of the relevant job
hierachy (assumed to be stable over time) and c1 represents the
equation error (assumed to be orthogonal to S. and C). If a,and
y were fixed over time and two years of promotion data were available,
the following equation could be estimated:
(8) +1 —= (s÷—S)+ (c÷ —er).
Note that —Swill always equal one; since there is no
variation in S1 —S,the model reduces to an equation with just a
contant term. In effect, then, this procedure can yield a reliable
estimate of the effects of length of service on promotion probabilities
only if we are confident thatis in fact fixed over time; any changes
in a, such as might be associated with faster or slower corporate
growth leading to a higher or lower overall promotion rate, will
contaminate the estimated value of 3. There is no obvious way to
escape this problem.
—13—Summarizing The Usefulness Of Promotions Data
While longitudinal data are thus not apt to be especially helpful,
the preceding discussion suggests we can glean some potentially useful
insights from cross—sectional promotions data. First, a negative service
coefficient in a simple promotions equation implies that merit is
important in the promotion process, though it reveals nothing about the
independent effect of length of service. The addition of performance or
potential measures to such an equation should move the estimated length
of service coefficient towards zero. Second, a positive service
coefficient in a simple promotion equation indicates that seniority plays
an important role in the promotion process, though it does not establish
that merit is unimportant. If seniority per se determines promotions
alone, the addition of performance or potential variables to the equation
should not affect the length of service coefficient2-"
IV.Analysis Of Actual Promotions Data
While we are convinced that our survey data offer uniquely valuable
insight into the role played by seniority in firms' advancement
decisions, it would certainly be reassuring if analyses of actual
promotions records were consistent with our findings. In this section of
the paper, we present and discuss evidence concerning the relationship of
company service and rated performance to the probability of being
promoted among one group of white male exempt employees, for whom
information on potential exists, and among a second group of unionized
hourly employees, for whom an objective measure of productivity is
available.
—14—Results for Sample Of Nonunion Salaried Employees
The first data set we will look at contains informationfor the
white male exempt employees of a large U.S.manufacturing corporation
which we will refer to as Company Exempt positions at Company C
are grouped into salary grade levels; we define a promotionas a move
from any salary grade to a higher salary grade level. Anemployee
relations manager at this firm told us thatamong the exempt population,
a junior employee would be promoted ahead of a more senioremployee who
wanted the job if the junior employee was considereda better performer
than the senior employee. Thus, in terms of oursurvey, this is a group
of employees in which junior employees would bepromoted ahead of senior
employees if they are expected to perform better on the next job or later
jobs; Table 2 reveals that 43 percent of those responding for salaried
nonunion employees gave similar replies.
Company C computerized personnel records contain a considerable
amount of information on each of its exempt employees. We were able to
get a fix on each employee who was with the company as of each year end
from 1973 through 1978. These data enabled us to estimate five sets of
promotion equations, one each for 1973—1974, 1974—1975, 1975—1976,
1976—1977 and 1977—1978. The information available on eachemployee
included education, age (used to construct apre—conipany experience
proxy), length of service, region where employed, race and sex. As
stated above, we restricted our analysis to white males. The personnel
records also contained annual performance ratings and an annual
assessment of potential for each employee. The performance rating is
assigned based upon the consensus of all the supervisors in an area and
measures how well an employee is fulfilling the responsibilities of his
—15—position. The potential rating represents the immediate supervisor's
assessment of the highest grade level an employee can be expected to
reach in the course of his career with Company C. This variable was made
continuous by assigning to each individual the 1977 mean salary for white
males in the grade level to which he could be expected to reach.
Table 3 reports the 1977—1978 promotion equations we estimated
using the Company C data; qualitatively similar results were obtained
with each of the other year's data. The model in column (1) includes
controls for education, pre—company experience, region and grade level in
addition to company service. As would be expected in a meritocratic
system, length of service bears a strong negative relationship to
probability of promotion. At the overall sample means, an additional
year of service is associated with a .005 or 4 percent lower probability
of being promoted. Can this lower probability be attributed to
discrimination against senior employees? The models presented in columns
(2), (3) and (4) suggest that it cannot be. The model in column (2) adds
performance rating dummies to the model reported in column (1). While
good performance at one level of the managerial hierarchy does not
necessarily imply success at the next level, the two should be positively
correlated. As expected, the introduction of the performance rating
dummies Into the promotion equation moves the estimated seniority
coefficient towards zero. The model (2) coefficients imply that at the
overall sample means, an additional year of service is associated with a
.003 or 2 percent lower probability of being promoted. One could argue
that the potential assessments mentioned above are a better measure of
employees' likely success in the next higher grade level than the
—16—Table 3: PromotIon Equations for Company C's Exempt Employees
Dependent Variable =1If Promoted





1 2 3 4
Yearsof Company Service/lO 1.954 —.961 —.795 .174 .011
[1.109] (.130) (.133) (.151) (.152)
(Years of Company Service)2/100 5.048 .116 .129 —.045 .003
[4.386) (.034) (.035) (.037) (.037)
Performance rating 1 .002 —.427 —.181
(worst; yes =1) [.048] (1.053) (1.039)
Performance rating 2 .123 —.250 —.195
(yes =1) [.329] (.170) (.170)
Performance rating 4 .261 .564 .436
(yes =1) [.439] (.110) (.110)
Performance rating 5 .265 1.137 .793
(yes =1) [.442] (.105) (.110)
Performancerating 6 .095 1.575 .896
(best; yes =1) [.293] (.126) (.142)
Ln (mean salary in potentially 10.421 3.612 2.782
highest grade) [.318] (.215) (.239)
Education dummies (4) yes yes yes yes
Pre—companyexperience yes yes yes yes
and its square
Grade level dummies (11) yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes
4321.31 4569.80 4638.03 4714.10
d.f. 19 24 20 25
a.Equations were estimated using a maximum likelihood logit procedure.
Individuals in grade levels where either everyone or no one received a promotion were
excluded from the logit samples. The mean (standard deviation)of the dependent
variableis .167 [.373]. All independent variables are as of December 31, 1977.
Note: Standard errors are enclosed in parentheses below the
coefficient estimates.
—17—performance ratings. These are introduced in model (3). With this
model's estimated coefficients, at the overall sample means, service has
virtually no association with the probability of being promoted.
Finally, model (4) includes both the rated performance dummies and the
rated potential variable. While the two ratings are related, each has
its own sizable relationship with chance of promotion. With both ratings
held constant, one more year of service is associated with a .0003 or .2
percent higher promotion probability.
These results match those predicted for a regime where promotions
are awarded meritocratically. In this sort of situation, the estimated
length of service coefficient in a promotion equation with no performance
or potential measure should be negative. However, the introduction of a
performance and/or potential measure should move the service coefficient
towards, and maybe even through, zero. This is what the Company C data
18/ show.—
Results For Sample Of Union Hourly Employees
Extending work done previously by Robert H. Yariker, we have also
examined data related to the promotion process for unionized hourly blue
collar employees at a U.S. manufacturing firm which we will refer to as
Company Among this group of employees, job movements occur
through a posting and bidding system. When there is a job opening, a
notice which describes the position and specifies its wage is posted on
all factory bulletin boards. Any employee can then file a bid for the
—18—posted job; on the bid, the employee gives hisor her seniority date and
outlines why he or she is qualified for thejob in question. The General
Foreman of the company reviews all of thebids and determines who is to
be given the job. The collectivebargaining agreement covering these
employees states that the selection is to be basedon "plant wide
seniority provided the individual is qualified." Theagreement further
specifies that:
Qualified for a job opening... meansthat an employee
has the basic knowledge required for ajob opening and/or
has demonstrated by workingon a similar, though perhaps
lower rated, job that he has the abilityto perform the
job involved.
Thus, while both seniority and ability arementioned, seniority would
appear to be the primary factor. In terms of oursurvey, this is a
group of employees among which the junior employee would never be
promoted ahead of his or her senior co—worker or would only be
promoted if he or she was significantly better. Table2 reveals that
two—thirds of those responding for unionized hourlyemployee groups
gave similar replies. For purposes of the analysis thatfollows, we
define a promotion as winning a bid to fill a vacantposition.
Company G keeps track of all jobs that are posted, including
the name of the successful bidder and thenames of all unsuccessful
bidders. We have studied all of the bids whichoccurred between
January 1, 1979 and July 1, 1979. Information onyears of service
and productivity could be obtained for 377hourly employees at the
company. The productivity index deserves more explanation. Each job
—19—that a worker does has a certain amount of time considered standard
for Its completion. The standard times are initially based on
engineering estimates and are then tested in the shop; in this study,
we use only production ratings based on tested standards. Production
ratings for each worker were derived as standard time divided by
actual time to complete the job. A final piece of information taken
from the personnel records was each employee's department; this was
needed because the different departments have different average
productivity ratings. For this reason, productivity indices equal to
an individual's production rating divided by his or her department's
mean rating were calculated and used in the investigation to be
summarized.
At Company G during the 6 months under analysis, information
existed on 125 bid groups in which a worker was awarded a posted
job. Because of the way advancement up the job hierarchy occurs
among the production workers at Company G, there was much less
dispersion in years of service among those bidding for a job than
among the work force as a whole; moreover, it was primarilylow
service employees at the bottom of the job pyramid who sought
advancement. Averaging across the 125 bid groups, we find a standard
deviation of years of service equal to 1.48 and a mean service of
3.71, whereas in the entire sample of 377 individuals the comparable
figures are 9.13 and 8.27. Averaging across bid groups reveals that
the standard deviation and mean in productivity within bid groups was
much closer to what was observed for the sample as a whole; within
bid groups the relevant figures were .22 and 1.03, and in the entire
sample they were .30 and 1.00. The productivity statistics are what
—20—might be expected in a promotion system where
ability/performance/potential played a very secondary role to
seniority per se in determining advancement.
Who won the bids? In 97 percent of the cases it was the bidder
with the greatest service. Was the senior winner also the most
productive? Only by chance it seems; in 52 percent of the bidgroups
the most senior worker who won the bid competition had the highest
production index, whereas in 48 percent he or she was dominated in
terms of productivity.
A full analysis of the advancement process at Company G cannot
be conducted, since data do not exist to place workers in the same or
comparable jobs at the beginning of the period under analysis.
However, our investigation of the bidding process reveals the very
important role of years of service in a promotion procedure which
relies on posting and bidding and is governed by a union contract.
V. Conclusions
The results reported in this paper have some important
implications. First, our finding that perhaps 60% of U.S. employees
work in settings where seniority leads to substantial preference in
promotion decisions seems inconsistent with the human capital view
that upward sloping tenure/earnings profiles necessarily reflect
upward sloping tenure/productivity profiles. In earlier work, we
have argued that none of the rather substantial within—job earnings
increment associated with seniority reflects a corresponding
within—job productivity increment; this increment must be considered
a return to seniority jse.2' These new results suggest that,
for a substantial part of the U.S. workforce, the earnings advantage
—21—enjoyed by longer service employees because they hold higher level
jobs must also be considered at least partly a return to seniority
independent of performance. Second, while our findings indicate that
length of service carries greater weight in the typical union hourly
promotion decision than in the typical nonunion hourly promotion
decision, this difference is less pronounced than one might have
expected based on an examination of written provisions covering the
two groups. For both nonunion and union employee groups, actual
practice regarding promotions seems to give more weight to length of
service than required by the terms of any written provisions. The
discrepancy between practice and policy is more marked for nonunion
employee groups. The seniority—based promotion rules prevalent in
union environments are often pointed to as an important cause of
inflexibility and reduced productivity in those settings. While such
seniority—based rules are certainly applied both more often and more
rigidly in union plants than in nonunion plants, these are
differences of degree rather than differences of kind. Even in the
absence of a union, managers are often not completely free to promote
the candidate expected to perform best on the new job. Even in the
presence of a union, management usually can avoid making a promotion
which would have very deterious productivity effects.
Several major questions remain unanswered by our research in
this area to date. What explains the diversity in promotion
practices across firms? How do these promotion practices fit into
the larger web of personnel practices at these firms? Why do so many
firms give such substantial weight to length of service per se in
rewarding promotions? Why do they give service per se still more
—22—weight In termination dI5euS5I05?a!! All of these questions
suggest possible directions for future explorations.
—23—FOOTNOTES
1. Becker [1975, PP. 16—37] lays out the basic human capital model
of on—the—job training. Mincer [1974, pp. 80—83] focuses
specifically on the promotions process; he argues that, even in
the union sector, promotions are most often awarded primarily
on the basis of merit rather than on the basis of seniority.
2. See U.S. Department of Labor [1970, pp. 36—37] and Bureau of
National Affairs [1983, p. El] for summaries of promotions
provisions found in two samples of collective bargaining
agreements. Slichter, Healy and Livernash [1960, pp. 178—210]
offers a classic discussion of how actual promotions practices
may diverge from contract language.
3. The same questionnaire was also sent to 250 randomly selected
manufacturing firms from a 1980 News Front listing. We
oversampled manufacturing because our survey contained
questions on layoffs in addition to the questions on promotions
used in this paper and we wanted to secure respnses from a
reasonable number of companies that had experienced workforce
reductions. In this paper, we chose to focus on our Standard
and Poor's responses because we felt they should be more
representative of the economy as a whole.
4. Tabulations based on the May 1979 Current Population Survey
show that 56 percent of those whose primary employment was in
the nonagricultural, nonconstruction private sector said they
worked for companies with 100 plus employees and 70 percent
said they worked for companies with 25 plus employees. Data
from the ES—202 program indicate that unemployment insurance
—24—reporting units with 50 or more employees account for 64
percent of total covered private sector employment outside
agriculture and construction; since firms may contain more than
one unemployment insurance reporting unit, firms with 50 or
more employees should account for some larger fraction of
covered employment in the relevant sectors.
5. There were a very small number of responses pertaining to
unionized salaried employees which were excluded from the
sample we used for analysis.
6. In addition to the questions described in the text, we also
asked about the total employment, product mix and location of
each firm in our sample. This information was used in some
sensitivity analyses.
7. See U.S. Department of Labor [1970,pp. 36—37].
8. See Bureau of National Affairs [1983, p. El].
9. One concern we had about the raw results reported in Table 1
was that they might be contaminated by nonresponse bias. To
check whether this was a problem, we prepared separate
tabulations for early responders (those who replied to our
original mailing) versus late responders (those who replied
only after receiving our followup letter) and then checked for
differences between the two groups' answers. Among both the
union hourly and the nonunion hourly replies, early responders
were significantly more likely than late responders to report
the existence of a written provision specifying seniority's
role in promotion (.895 versus .766 for the union hourly
implies and .311 versus .115 for the nonunion hourly replies).
—25—These were the only significant early/late differences we
found. The qualitative conclusions derived from either the
early responses alone or the late responses alone are the same
as those derived from Table 1. We also looked at two sets of
weighted tabulations, one which corrected for differing
response rates across nine firm size/industry cells and a
second which used CPS employment weights for the same firm
size/industry cells. Both of these sets of numbers were very
similar to those reported in Table 1.
10.This very rough estimate was obtained by weighting the
estimates for union hourly employees, nonunion hourly employees
and salaried employees by the fractions of private sector,
nonagricultural, nonconstruction employment in each of these
same three groups. The employment figures were derived from
the May 1978 Current Population Survey (CPS): union members
paid by the hour, 17 percent; nonmembers paid by the hour, 43
percent; and nonhourly employees, 40 percent, of which 8
percent were union and 92 percent were nonunion. There was no
way to distinguish nonexempt and exempt salaried employment on
the CPS.
11.See Dean [1982]. The numbers we cite are not reported in
Dean's paper but can be derived from those he does report.
12.See Mills [19821.
13. As with our Table 1 results, we were concerned that the numbers
reported in Table 2 might be contaminated by nonresponse bias.
We again prepared separate tabulations for early versus late
responders. The distribution of early union hourly responses
was significantly different from the distribution of late union
—26—hourly responses, with the late distribution includinga higher
proportion of answers at one extreme or the other. However,
once again, the qualitative conclusions derivable from either
the early responses alone or the lateresponses alone are no
different than those derived from the figureswe report. We
also prepared two sets of weighted tabulations like those
reported in Table 2, one of which corrected forresponse rate
variation across nine firm size/industry cells and a second
which used CPS employment weights for thesame firm
size/industry cells. The results were in both casesvery
similar to those we report.
14.The 60 percent figure was derived in the fashion described in
footnote 10.
15.One would actually want to estimatea logit or. a probit
equation rather than an ordinary least squares regression, but
the bias argument made here in terms of anordinary least
squares regression should be qualitatively correct.
16.We have discussed the problem of interpretingpromotion
equation estimates for a group of employees who all are covered
by the same internal labor market rules. Additional
complications arise if one tries to analyze a data set like the
Quality of Employment Survey (QES) panel or the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics, where the individual observations come from
many different occupational groups and from many different
firms. Olson and Berger (1982) report the results of a
promotions analysis based on the QES panel and also offer an
insightful discussion of some of the potential problems with
their approach.
—27—17. A more detailed description of this data set and related
estimates can be found in Medoff and Abraham [1981].
18.We also estimated models like those in column (1) and column
(2) using data for another firm's white male exempt employees.
The relevant promotion process had been described to us as
meritocratic. See the the discussion pertaining to Company B
in Medoff and Abraham [1980] for a detailed description of this
data set. As with the Company C data, the promotion equation
with no performance rating dummies produced a negative and
strongly significant service effect. Introducing the
performance rating dummies moved the service effect towards
zero, though the shift was much less pronounced than in the
Company C data.
19.See Yanker [1980] for a more detailed discussion of these data
and some related estimates.
20.See Medoff and Abraham [1980] and Medoff and Abraham [19811.
21.See Abraham and Medoff [1983].
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